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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INDIAN LAW: IMPACT ON PRIVATE
EQUITY TRANSACTIONS
-Vijay

Sambamurthi*

Abstract-Private equity investments have been growing rapidly in India. The growth may be attributed to the fact that
companies which are funded by private equity funds often
perform better compared to those which are not. Therefore,
investments of such kind have gained importance, making it
imperative to understand the legal framework that governs private equity fund and investments. Recently, the regulatory
framework governing private equity funds and investments
in India has seen notable changes. These changes have mostly
found place in the Companies Act, 2013, securities laws enacted
by the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the Income-Tax
Act, 1961, and the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.
This article seeks to lay down the broad structure of the regulatory framework by tracing the legal developments in the legislations which govern private equity funds and their investments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 2010 and 2014, private equity (hereinafter "PE") and venture capital investments into India grew at a compounded annual rate of 20 percent.' The
reasons for this are not hard to find. India presents a compelling growth opportunity backed by a stable political and legal framework, and is driven by a booming
middle-class consumer story and a rapidly digitising and urbanising population.
The author is the Founder and Managing Partner of Lexygen, and regularly advises some of the
top private equity funds on their investments and exits in India. He has advised on several of
India's market leading private equity and M&A transactions. The author would like to acknowledge and thank Vishnu Chandran (Senior Associate, Lexygen) and Vishal Achanta (Associate,
Lexygen) for the valuable research assistance provided in writing this article.
Aparna Sheth, Madhur Singhal & Pankaj Taneja, Indian Private Equity Report 2015, BAIN
& COMPANY, INC. AND THE INDIAN PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, http://bit.
ly/lQkoZcS.
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Recently, despite choppy macroeconomic seas and a global economic downturn,
India has emerged as a leader amongst the 'emerging markets' of the world. With
liberalisation having begun a quarter-century ago, and a possible second phase of
progress and reform in the offing, India's vibrant economy presents particularly
fertile ground for PE funds. PE funds have been bullish on India and continue to
remain so (2015 saw a record inflow of an estimated USD 16.8 billion from PE
funds).2
Empirical evidence has shown that in the Indian context, PE-funded companies perform strongly in comparison to their non-PE funded peers,3 and that PE
funds are now a significant source of finance for Indian companies.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of PE funds' activity in India has been
the re-working of the model traditionally employed by PE funds in the USA and
Europe to adapt to the Indian regulatory and legal framework. As one commentator points out: "While the traditional PE model has been successful in developed economies, PE firms quickly realised that transplantingthis model to India
would prove difficult due to various legal constraints. Accordingly, PEfirms in
India have developed an alternate model...and customised [it]for India's complex
regulatory and governance environment."4 This adaptation and re-working of the
traditional PE model points to the constraints in India's regulatory framework for
PE funds.
Over the last decade and a half, the overarching theme on the regulatory front
has been one of liberalisation and rationalisation, though not without setbacks.
Changes in the legal framework, especially in taxation laws, have had a significant impact on investor sentiment in both public and private capital markets. This
paper seeks to provide a high-level overview of the recent changes in law that
impact PE activity and deal structuring in India.
A brief summary of the legal framework governing PE investments into
Indian companies is in order before we look into notable changes in this framework. Broadly, the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter "2013 Act"), securities laws
enacted by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (hereinafter "SEBI"), and
the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter "ITA") are the relevant laws that impact
PE funds. Further, since the Indian Rupee is not fully convertible on the capital account, investments by non-residents (a majority of PE funds are non-residents) are governed by the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (hereinafter
"FEMA").

2

Indian Private Equity Trend Report 2016, Venture Intelligence,http://bit.ly/28SjUqS.

3

Vivek Pandit, ToshanTamlhane, & Rohit Kapur, Indian Private Equity: Route to Resurgence,
McKINSEY & COMPANY (June 2015), http://bit.1y/28UTvK3.

4

Afra Afsharipour, The Indian Private Equity Model, NSE
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Companies Act
The 2013 Act, which came into force over 2014, was enacted to carry out a
much-needed overhaul of India's previous company legislation (hereinafter "1956
Act"), and improve corporate governance standards. While the 1956 Act drew
a strong distinction between private companies (these were lightly regulated in
view of the fact that they were partnership-like, closely-held entities) and public
companies (which had a broader shareholder base and thus merited greater regulation), the 2013 Act blurred this distinction and subjected private companies to a
heavy compliance burden.
(a) Private Placement
Given that Indian company law does not permit private companies to offer
their securities to the public at large, capital raising by private limited companies takes place through the issuance of securities to a select number of pre-determined persons in what is known as a 'private placement'. Since investments by
PE funds usually involve a private placement, the mechanics of private placement
is critical to smooth deal-making.
Under the 1956 Act, private companies could offer securities to a maximum of
49 persons through a private placement. Crucially, the private placement process
under the 1956 Act was minimally regulated and hence, the process of issuing
securities to PE funds to secure financing was, from a corporate compliance perspective, relatively straightforward.
The 2013 Act upended this situation by regulating private placements quite
heavily by requiring that a long list of disclosures be made to persons proposing
to subscribe to the private placement of a company's securities, and prescribing
numerous other corporate secretarial actions for a private placement. Further, a
company issuing securities in a private placement must also obtain a valuation
report upon which the price of the securities being offered is to be based. This
over regulation of private placements is misplaced in the context of PE investments - sophisticated investors such as PE funds do not require extensive disclosures from a company offering its securities, and there exists no rationale to
regulate the financing activities of private companies since there is no offer being
made to the public.
The rigours of a private placement under the 2013 Act have led companies to
raise capital by disguising their private placements as 'rights issues' (i.e., shares
are offered by a company to its existing shareholders in a rights issue, and such
shareholders will then renounce the right to subscribe to the shares in favour of
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an investor, upon which the company will allot the shares to the investor). While
this results in a smoother issuance process, it carries a degree of regulatory
risk as it perhaps goes against the legislative intent. While amendments to the
2013 Act's private placement process are on the anvil, these amendments do not
address the issues raised above.

(b) Directors' Liability
The 1956 Act did not explicitly set out a director's fiduciary duties - these
duties arose from well-understood common law rules. The 2013 Act (in response
to recent corporate governance scandals) has codified the duties of directors of a
company, and significantly expanded the liabilities that directors of a company
could be exposed to. Notably, in the event of any corporate wrongdoing, non-executive directors who do not take part in a company's day-to-day activities could
be exposed to liabilities because such directors could be deemed to have knowledge of such company's acts.
Since a seat on the board of a portfolio company is a standard deal term in
PE deals, PE funds have taken note of the very real possibility that the nominee
directors they place on the boards of their portfolio companies are exposed to liabilities due to the 2013 Act's strong director liability regime.
As a result, more and more PE funds require "directors' & officers' liability insurance" policies to be taken out by their portfolio companies, and also
insist upon indemnification for any liability attaching to their nominee directors.
Another route PE funds might take to address this issue is to forgo a board seat
as a director, and instead nominate a 'board observer' to exercise oversight over
portfolio companies. While the intent behind increasing the scope of directors'
liabilities is praiseworthy, the 2013 Act has regulated with a heavy hand - judicial
guidance on the extent of directors' liabilities is awaited, and in the meantime,
PE funds must strategise to mitigate this risk.
(c) Compulsorily Convertible Debentures
Compulsorily convertible debentures (hereinafter "CCDs") have been a popular instrument for PE funds investing in India. Indian company law seeks to
protect a company's creditors by categorising certain sums due from a company
as 'deposits', and prescribing onerous compliances thereon. Under the 1956 Act,
CCDs could avoid being categorised as 'deposits' if (i) they were convertible
into equity, or (ii) they were secured by immovable property. However, under the
2013 Act, to avoid categorisation as a 'deposit', CCDs must (i) convert into equity
within 5 years, or (ii) be secured by a first charge or a charge ranking pari passu
with the first charge on assets of the issuing company. The 2013 Act thus introduces difficulties into structuring a PE investment employing CCDs because it
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imposes a cap on the conversion period of CCDs, or alternately requires portfolio companies to provide significant security against CCDs - something that they
may be neither willing to, nor capable of, doing.

B. Exchange Control
Under FEMA, the Reserve Bank of India (hereinafter "RBI") regulates foreign investment into Indian entities. Foreign investment can be made into India,
inter alia, through the foreign direct investment (hereinafter "FDI") route, or
through entities registered with the SEBI as foreign portfolio investors (hereinafter "FPIs") or foreign venture capital investors (hereinafter "FVCIs"). Under
FEMA, the RBI regulates, inter alia, the price at which PE funds enter into and
exit Indian companies, the extent to which foreign investors can invest in Indian
companies engaged in certain sectors, and the types of entities foreign investment
can flow into.
(a) Optionality Clauses & Other Instruments
PE funds have typically structured their investments into Indian companies
with a bouquet of downside protection and exit mechanisms. One such mechanism is a 'put option' requiring the investee company or its promoters to buyback
securities held by the PE fund in the event that an exit has not been delivered
within a specified timeline. Previously, despite the lack of a clear rule in this
regard, on an ad hoc basis, the RBI objected to instruments with put options in
certain deals on the ground that such instruments were debt disguised as equity
(in India debt and equity investments are regulated under two separate exchange
control regimes). The ostensible reason why the RBI took this view is because
instruments with a put option might allow foreign investors to exit from their
investments with an assured return, thus insulating them from the risks associated with equity investments. Notwithstanding the lack of clarity over their
enforceability, put options linked to a specified internal rate of return were a
regular feature of Indian PE deal documentation, albeit clouded by regulatory
uncertainty.
After prolonged uncertainty, in 2014 the RBI legalised 'put options', subject
to certain conditions such as a lock-in period and restrictions on the pricing at
the time of exit, with the guiding principle being that a foreign investor would
not be allowed to exit with an assured return. The legalisation of put options
brought in much needed clarity, but the RBI's stance against options allowing an
assured return means that PE funds still do not have the flexibility to completely
protect themselves against downside scenarios. Of late, however, there have been
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indications from the RBI that it is ready to allow foreign investors some flexibility and permit instruments that give an assured return as a downside protection.
Another notable development is that in 2015, partly paid-up shares and warrants were made eligible instruments for FDI. Prior to 2015, only equity, compulsorily convertible preference shares or CCDs were eligible instruments for FDI,
and the use of warrants or partly-paid up shares for FDI was subject to governmental approval. The conditions for the use of partly-paid up shares and warrants
for making FDI are that (i) their pricing should be determined upfront, and (ii) 25
percent of the consideration amount should be received upfront, with the balance
consideration to be remitted within 18 months. While the intent behind permitting warrants as an eligible instrument for FDI seems to be to permit more flexibility in the choice of instrument, in practice, the condition that 25 percent of the
consideration be committed upfront is onerous, and defeats the very purpose of
issuing warrants. Therefore, warrants continue to be an unattractive instrument
for PE funds when investing in India.
(b) Changes to the FPIand FVCI regimes
A PE fund, by registering as an FPI or an FVCI with SEBI, could also invest
in India through the FPI or FVCI route. Investing through the FPI route permits
PE funds to trade in listed securities such as equities, while investing through the
FVCI route permits PE funds to enter into and exit from Indian companies without having to comply with the pricing guidelines for entry and exit under FEMA.
These attributes make the FPI route and the FVCI route attractive to PE funds.
(i)

Changes to the FPJ regime

Under the FDI regime, limits are imposed on the amount of foreign investment
permitted in Indian companies engaged in certain specified sectors (referred to
as 'sectoral caps'). Historically 'sub-limits' within such overall investment limits were prescribed for investments by FPIs in certain 'sensitive' sectors where
the government was uncomfortable with the volatility caused by the FPIs' 'hot
money'. For instance, while the overall limit on foreign investment in the defence
sector was 49 percent, FPIs were permitted to invest only up to 24 percent in the
sector. In 2015, the Indian government did away with the sub-limits for investments by FPIs and introduced composite caps for foreign investment in such sectors. Thus, in a move that is likely to bring greater capital inflow, FPIs are now
permitted to invest in Indian companies up to the prescribed sectoral caps.
5

For example, in 2015, the RBI permitted the Tata Group to purchase NTT DOCOMO, Inc.'s stake
in their Indian joint venture at a pre-determined price that was higher than the permissible exit
price under FEMA. Further, in his Sixth Bi-Monthly Monetary Policy Statement, 2014-15, the
Governor of the RBI stated that the RBI proposed to "introduce greater flexibility in the pricing
of instruments, including an assured return.. .through an embedded optionality clause."
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Another significant development with regard to FPIs is the RBI's proposal to
allow FPIs to invest in unlisted corporate bonds issued by Indian companies, a
move aimed at deepening India's bond markets. Currently, FPIs are only allowed
to invest in listed or to-be-listed corporate bonds, and in unlisted bonds of companies engaged in the infrastructure sector; PE funds made use of the FPI route
to invest in Indian companies through structured debt instruments, especially
in the real estate sector. One of the drawbacks of this route however, was that
the investee company had to get its bonds listed within a specified time period,
which may not be feasible for many companies. In the event the RBI decides
to permit FPIs to invest in unlisted corporate bonds this drawback would be
removed, and given the other developments in the tax and legal framework surrounding debt investments, we could see significant PE activity in the debt space
going forward.
(ii) Changes to the FVCJ regime
PE funds investing through the FVCI route can avail of certain relaxations and
exemptions: inter alia, investments through the FVCI route can be made using
equity-linked instruments and FVCIs can benefit from relaxations under certain securities laws. However, FVCIs were permitted to invest only in nine sectors (hereinafter "Permitted Sectors"). 6 Recently, the RBI has permitted FVCIs
to invest outside the Permitted Sectors, provided the investee entity meets certain criteria,' and has also permitted FVCIs to invest in companies engaged in
the infrastructure sector. While these amendments appear to be geared toward
attracting early-stage risk capital, the liberalisation of the FVCI route once again
increases the attractiveness of the FVCI route for PE funds.
(iii) Escrow/DeferredPayment
PE deal terms often involve an escrow or deferred payment arrangement in
order to accommodate indemnity for representations and warranties, or in order
to provide for earn-outs to existing management/promoters. Until very recently,
any deferred payment arrangement required RBI approval, and escrow arrangements lasting for more than 6 months required RBI approval.
The RBI has now liberalised these conditions: buyers are permitted to defer
payment of up to 25 percent of the total consideration for a period of 18 months
6

The nine sectors are: biotechnology, IT related hardware and software development, nanotechnology, seed research and development, research and development of new chemical entities in pharmaceutical sector, dairy industry, poultry industry, production of bio-fuels, and
hotel-cum-convention centres with seating capacity of more than 3,000.
The investee entity must be (i) less than 5 years old, (ii) its annual turnover must never have
exceeded INR 250 million, and (iii) it must be working towards innovation, development, deployment or commercialisation of new products, processes or services driven by technology or intellectual property.
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from the date of the definitive documents, and escrow arrangements are permitted on similar terms; any deferred payment or escrow beyond the abovementioned limits still requires RBI approval. However, while the extant rules did not
prescribe any limits on the amounts or period of indemnification by sellers in
share purchase transactions, the RBI has now clarified that in transactions involving a deferred payment, any indemnification provided by sellers must comply
with the abovementioned limits, or otherwise be cleared by the RBI. The above
amendment is a welcome change as it provides PE funds with greater flexibility when structuring transactions involving a deferred payment or escrow element
- importantly, the need to seek the RBI's approval can be obviated in certain
circumstances.
(iv) Investments into AJFs
Alternative Investment Funds (hereinafter "AJFs") are onshore fund vehicles
regulated by SEBI, and in the four years since AJFs were introduced, the vehicle has seen a significant amount of success. While AJFs may be organised as
companies, trusts or limited liability partnerships, for certain tax reasons that are
elaborated upon below, AJFs are usually structured as trusts. However, FEMA
did not specifically permit foreign investments into trust vehicles, and this caused
significant uncertainty amongst both the sponsors of PE funds and investors in
PE funds (referred to as 'limited partners' or "LPs" in industry parlance). Further,
there was lack of clarity regarding whether investments by AJFs that pooled foreign capital would be considered downstream foreign investment.
In 2015, the RBI clarified this issue by expressly allowing foreign investment into AJFs without having to obtain RBI approval, and further clarified that
investments by AJFs would not be considered downstream foreign investment so
long as neither the sponsor nor the investment manager of the AIF is owned or
controlled by non-residents. This is a highly positive development that will be a
huge boost for the Indian AIF industry because it will enable them to raise funds
from foreign LPs easily.
C. Taxation
India has, over the years, gained a reputation for having an unpredictable tax
environment. The situation is still very much one where PE funds often do not
have clear visibility on tax outcomes. Below, some of the recent tax developments
that impact PE funds are briefly described.
(a) Amendment of the Indo-Mauritian DTAA
Undoubtedly the most significant development in tax law impacting PE funds
is the recent amendment of the Indo-Mauritian Double Taxation Avoidance
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Agreement (hereinafter "Indo-Mauritian DTAA"). PE funds have historically
invested in India through intermediate holding vehicles based in Mauritius to
take the benefits of the Indo-Mauritian DTAA, and thus eliminate tax leakages in
India. The amendment to the Indo-Mauritian DTAA now restores India's right to
tax capital gains on the sale of shares made by Mauritius-based PE funds - therefore, investing through Mauritius will no longer shield PE funds from having to
pay tax in India.
While the amendment does grandfather investments made prior to April
1, 2017, and provides for certain tax benefits to investors that satisfy a 'limitation-of-benefits' clause for a two year period thereon, PE funds will need to
re-think their India-focused investment structures. Notably, the amendments to
the Indo-Mauritian DTAA would not capture capital gains made on the sale of
CCDs, or on the sale of derivatives and other securities, and therefore, capital
gains on the sale of these instruments will still be exempt from tax in India.
The amendments to the Indo-Mauritian DTAA indicate that the Indian government has taken a strong stand against tax planning practices. Despite industry forecasts that the amendment to the Indo-Mauritian DTAA will deter foreign
investors, the recent rationalisation of domestic long term capital gains tax rate
downward to 10 percent means that PE funds may now decide to price this tax
into their investments.
An equally important effect of the amendment to the Indo-Mauritian DTAA is
the consequent amendment of the double taxation avoidance agreement between
India and Singapore (hereinafter "India-Singapore DTAA"). The reason for this
is that the protocol to the India-Singapore DTAA provides that in the event the
Indo-Mauritian DTAA is amended such that Mauritius can no longer tax capital gains earned by Mauritian companies from the sale of an Indian company's shares, Singapore would also lose the right to tax capital gains earned by
Singaporean companies from the sale of an Indian company's shares under the
India-Singapore DTAA. Therefore, India (not Singapore) can now tax the capital gains earned by Singaporean residents from the sale of shares of an Indian
company. In recent times, Singapore has emerged as a popular destination from
which to invest into India and many PE investors have chosen to invest into India
through Singapore domiciled funds. It is possible that with the amendment to the
India-Singapore DTAA described above, Singapore will also lose its appeal as a
jurisdiction in which to domicile India-focused PE funds.
Mauritius and Singapore apart, PE funds have also employed the Netherlands
and Cyprus as intermediate holding company jurisdictions when investing into
India. However, press reports suggest that in line with the Indian government's
stance against tax treaty abuse, India is in the process of renegotiating its treaties
with Cyprus and the Netherlands.
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(b) Characterisation of Income
The income earned by PE funds from the sale of securities is usually characterised as 'capital gains', as opposed to 'business income' (capital gains are
taxed at lower rates than business income). However, the criteria employed by
tax authorities when characterising income as 'capital gains' or 'business income'
are quite subjective, and this has been a continuous source of uncertainty for PE
funds. After protracted litigation on this point, the Indian tax authorities recently
issued a series of circulars providing objective criteria to guide tax officers when
characterising income (hereinafter "Tax Circulars"). The Tax Circulars sought to
give taxpayers certainty regarding the characterisation of their income from the
sale of shares.
As per the Tax Circulars, income earned from the sale of listed shares will be
characterised as capital gains if such shares are held for 12 months prior to their
sale. Income earned from the sale of unlisted shares will be characterised as capital gains, regardless of the period of holding prior to sale - however, there are
caveats: tax officers have the discretion to treat income earned from the sale of
a private company's shares as 'business income' (i) where the genuineness of the
transaction is questionable, (ii) where a question pertaining to lifting the corporate veil arises, and most troublingly (iii) where there is a transfer of the control
and management of the underlying business along with the shares.
The Tax Circulars may thus have the opposite of their intended effect - by
giving tax officers the leeway to challenge income characterisation on highly nebulous grounds such as 'genuineness', or whether the corporate veil can be lifted,
the Tax Circulars merely open the door for further controversy on this point. The
Tax Circulars have the effect of causing massive uncertainty for PE funds looking to do 'control' deals; it is another matter that the meaning of the term 'control' is itself highly unclear.
(c) Pass-through status for AlFs
Originally under the ITA, only venture capital funds registered under the
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Venture Capital Funds) Regulations,
1996 (hereinafter "VCF Regulations") and investments in companies operating in the Permitted Sectors were accorded with 'pass-through' status, i.e., there
would be no taxation at the fund level, and LPs' gains from the fund's exits
would be taxed as though the LPs had invested directly into portfolio companies. This position was amended when the Securities and Exchange Board
of India (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 (hereinafter "AIF
Regulations") came into force and 'pass-through' status was granted to all
While the VCF Regulations catered to all kinds of investment funds investing in unlisted Indian
companies, the AIF Regulations had categorised investment funds into several sub-categories
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investment funds registered as 'venture capital funds' under Category I of the
AIF Regulations, irrespective of the sector in which their portfolio companies
operated in. While this took away the sector specific investment requirement for
venture capital funds, none of the other sub-categories of AJFs (such as private
equity funds or infrastructure funds) were granted 'pass-through' status and such
funds had to rely on a certain structuring mechanism involving a degree of tax
ambiguity for attaining 'pass-through status'.
The funds industry made numerous representations to the Indian government
requesting that 'pass-through' status under the ITA be extended to all sub-categories of AIFs, and in 2015, the Indian government amended the ITA to grant
'pass-through' status to all AIFs other than hedge funds.
This was a highly sought-after, and very positive, development but again was
not without a few drawbacks. For instance, the 'pass-through' status offered to
onshore PE funds would only be applicable for income characterised as 'capital
gains', and not for income characterised as 'business income' (as noted above,
income characterisation is itself a highly vexed issue).
(d) Onshore Fund Managers
Historically, PE funds have preferred to base their fund management entities offshore for the fear of being exposed to the tax risk of having a permanent establishment in India, or being regarded as an Indian tax resident. Apart
from the impact on fund structuring, this has led to the Indian fund management industry moving offshore to reduce tax risks. Recently, there have been two
developments that impact PE fund managers.
The first is the introduction of a "substance-over-form" test for corporate residency based on the 'place of effective management' (hereinafter "PoEM") of an
entity into the ITA in 2015. While the PoEM test is yet to come into force (it
will become effective from April 1, 2017), its wide scope means that offshore
PE funds having onshore investment advisory entities could be dragged into the
Indian tax net, because tax authorities will regard them as being effectively managed from India. As with other pain points within the ITA, the issue once again
is the lack of clarity that the PoEM test causes, and thus, the PoEM test could
now further incentivise PE funds to base their investment advisory entities offshore. That said, Indian tax authorities have published a draft guidance which
states that the existence of onshore support functions that are preparatory and
auxiliary in character will not be conclusive evidence that an offshore company's

under three broad categories: (i) Category I encompassing, venture capital funds, infrastructure
funds, SMLE funds, etc., (ii) Category II encompassing private equity funds, and (iii) Category III
encompassing hedge funds.
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PoEM is in India - possibly opening up a safe harbour for PE funds to base their
fund managers onshore.
This brings us to the second recent fund manager-related development in
Indian tax law. In 2015, the Indian government sought to encourage offshore
funds to move their fund managers into India by providing that an offshore fund
by virtue of having onshore fund managers alone would not be subject to taxation
in India. The PE industry was, however, largely dissatisfied with the amendment
since the conditions to qualify for the above safe harbour were onerous. While
the Indian government recently tried to rationalise these qualifying conditions,
the funds industry continues to perceive them as onerous.
The net effect is that for the near term, it appears that PE funds will continue
to base their fund managers offshore.
(e) General Anti-Avoidance Rules
The general anti-avoidance rules (hereinafter "GAAR") were inserted into the
ITA in 2012, and will come into force from April 1, 2017. The GAAR represent
by far the most significant tax concern for PE funds. While the courts in India
have generally restricted tax authorities' discretion to 'look-through' tax planning
structures and required tax authorities to use a "form-over-substance" approach,
under the provisions of the GAAR, tax authorities have extensive discretion to
disregard or invalidate an arrangement entered into with the main objective of tax
avoidance. This could have a significant impact on PE funds that have structured
their investments into India through tax friendly jurisdictions, as tax authorities
could invoke the GAAR to invalidate such tax planning arrangements, unless PE
funds are able to demonstrate adequate commercial rationale and substance in
their arrangements.
Currently, there is considerable debate regarding whether the GAAR will
apply to structures that qualify under treaty based anti-abuse provisions such as
'limitation-of-benefit' clauses, and given that India is in the process of amending
its relevant tax treaties, guidance is awaited from the Indian government and tax
authorities regarding the exact scope of the GAAR's applicability. The introduction of the GAAR may require the PE funds to re-look at their existing structures
and ensure their robustness, so as to withstand scrutiny under the GAAR.

(f Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
In 2015, India entered into agreements with the United States to implement
a United States legislation known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(hereinafter "FATCA"), and inserted certain provisions of FATCA into rules
made under the ITA. FATCA is aimed at collecting tax information regarding the
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United States' citizens. As such, FATCA imposes heavy reporting and compliance obligations upon resident Indian entities having direct or indirect investment
by the residents of the United States. In particular, it impacts onshore PE funds
that have resident American LPs, or LPs that are beneficially owned by resident
American entities. Due to FATCA's incorporation into the ITA, onshore PE funds
could be obligated to perform due diligence and collect data regarding their LPs,
and to make reports to the Indian tax authorities.

D. Distressed Deals
One of the major talking points of the last year has been the massive build-up
of non-performing loans on the books of major Indian banks. This is indicative of
a larger issue: corporate India has a significant debt problem, and this presents a
compelling opportunity for PE funds.
Interest in this opportunity has been bolstered by numerous legal developments that seem to be coming together at the right time. For one, the Indian
government is rapidly moving toward improving the country's debt recovery and
corporate resolution laws and infrastructure. Perhaps the stand-out reform in this
area is the recently enacted Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2015 (hereinafter
"Insolvency Code"). The Insolvency Code, and other recently proposed amendments to debt recovery legislations, consolidate the legal regime for insolvency
and provide for a framework in which bondholders can speedily recover debts or
turnaround companies.
Another key reform that dovetails with the Insolvency Code is the framework laid down by the RBI (wearing its banking regulator hat) for banks to
take control of defaulting corporate borrowers. Known as the Strategic Debt
Restructuring (hereinafter "SDR") scheme, this framework permits banks to convert their debt into equity, take control of borrowers, and remove their extant
managements when defaults by borrowers cross certain thresholds. Subsequently,
the SDR requires banks to exit such defaulting borrowers via a stake sale. This
presents an opportunity for PE funds to acquire companies at attractive valuations from banks that are anxious to get bad debt off their books, and turn them
around. Given the fact that the SDR scheme has seen considerable use till date,
the industry expects significant distressed 'Mergers & Acquisitions' (hereinafter
"M&A") activity.
The government has also made efforts to attract investment into asset reconstruction companies (hereinafter "ARCs"). ARCs are specialised vehicles set up
under a statutory framework to securitize loans originated from banks - however,
they have not seen much success since their inception due to a lack of capital.
The government has now proposed to allow a sponsor to hold the entire capital
of an ARC, has also allowed foreign investment up to 100 percent in ARCs under
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the automatic route, and has similarly allowed FPIs to invest in 100 per cent
of the security receipts issued by ARCs. These measures should hopefully help
ARCs attract some much needed capital. There are already serious indications of
interest from several PE funds around the world on the heels of this development.
In sum, these developments promise highly exciting times for PE funds engaged
in the distressed, turnaround and special situations spaces.

E. Antitrust
India's antitrust regulator, the Competition Commission of India (hereinafter
"CCI") has taken on an increasing importance for PE funds. Rules made under
the Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter "Competition Act") regulate M&A activity (hereinafter "Combination Rules") by putting in place a 'suspensory' merger
control regime which requires acquirers to notify the CCI prior to closing a transaction, in the event the transaction meets certain prescribed financial thresholds
(hereinafter "Thresholds"). Notifying the CCI and obtaining its approval stretches
deal timelines and inflates transaction costs. Relevant developments in this space
have been with regard to the exemptions from having to notify deals for the
CCI's approval.
While the Combination Regulations do provide for certain exemptions from
notifying the CCI, the CCI's decisional practice over 2015 tended towards narrowing down of these exemptions, such that PE deals which cross the Thresholds
would usually require notification to the CCI. In 2016, the CCI amended the
Combination Regulations to virtually shut down exemptions available to PE
funds in this regard. While PE funds acquiring up to 25 percent in companies
(without acquiring any control) were previously exempted from the notifying
requirement, this threshold has now been brought down to 10 percent.
On the other hand, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (hereinafter "MCA") has
recently doubled the financial amounts on which the Thresholds are based and
extended the life of certain other exemptions available from the requirement to
notify transactions to the CCI. Currently, transactions involving a target company
with either assets of the value of not more INR 3.5 billion in India or turnover of
not more than INR 10 billion in India would be exempt from the requirement to
obtain prior approval from the CCI.

F.

Dispute Resolution

The slow dispute resolution mechanism in India has been a pain point for foreign investors. Over the past year, the Indian government has made a demonstrable effort to improve dispute resolution mechanisms in India. Below are some
notable developments in this regard.
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(a) Amendment of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996
Defects in the drafting of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter "Arbitration Act"), coupled with considerable judicial divergence over the
interpretation of its provisions, had prevented arbitration in India from becoming
truly effectual. This was compounded by uncertainty over the scope of a challenge to a foreign arbitral award in Indian courts and the permissible degree of
interference or assistance by an Indian court during the pendency of such arbitrations. In 2015, the government amended the Arbitration Act to clearly delineate the limits on Indian courts' powers to review foreign seated arbitral awards.
Other amendments to the Arbitration Act now clarify that parties to an agreement may choose to allow Indian courts limited powers to grant interim reliefs
with regard to a foreign seated arbitration, and that such interim relief may be
obtained from High Courts in India.
These amendments, coupled with the increasingly pro-arbitration approach
taken by Indian courts, has given comfort to PE funds regarding foreign seated
arbitrations with Indian parties that would need to be enforced through Indian
courts. However, it should be noted that the concept of 'seat of arbitration' has
neither been defined nor clarified by the amendments to the Arbitration Act and
therefore, arbitration clauses in deal documentation need to be crafted carefully
to avoid grey areas in their interpretation.
(b) National Company Law Tribunal
Under the 1956 Act, numerous issues related to companies were litigated
before, or carried out through a statutorily established tribunal called the
Company Law Board (hereinafter "CLB"). However, the CLB's jurisdiction was
limited with regard to the matters it could hear, and other courts/tribunals also
dealt with company matters in a fragmented manner. The 2013 Act has replaced
the CLB with the National Company Law Tribunal (hereinafter "NCLT"). While
the NCLT had a turbulent gestation (it survived two constitutional challenges), it
represents a new kind of company disputes forum: the NCLT will hear all matters related to companies (including amalgamations, class action suits, and liquidations), and appeals from the NCLT will go to an appellate body and then to the
Supreme Court of India. The NCLT will also have qualified technical members
and benches across the country. Importantly, the jurisdiction of the NCLT ousts
the jurisdiction of other civil courts in India. The introduction of the NCLT has
the potential to be a watershed moment for Indian corporate litigation - it could
result in a streamlined and effective forum in which company matters could be
litigated.

VOL. 28

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIAN LAW

59

G. Anti-Corruption Laws
An area of increasing concerns for PE funds and LPs is the threat of enforcement actions under the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(hereinafter "FCPA"), and the United Kingdom's Bribery Act, 2010. These laws
essentially expose PE funds to liabilities in the event that their associates in foreign countries engage in corrupt practices.
The FCPA prohibits American entities, as well as their officers and employees, from directly or indirectly bribing a 'foreign official' to obtain an improper
business advantage. The United States' Department of Justice has in recent times
been very actively pursuing cases under the FCPA against large corporations and
has also been levying astronomical fines. For sponsors of India-focused funds,
this means that illegal payments made by their portfolio companies in India could
cause significant legal and reputational damage to the sponsor itself. Given that
corruption has been a high-profile issue in India of late, PE funds must be aware
of the significant levels of risks posed by the Anti-Corruption Laws when acquiring interests in Indian companies.
To mitigate this risk, PE funds must consider performing a thorough due diligence of portfolio companies for any history of corrupt practices - in certain
situations, a forensic audit by experts may be called for. From a documentation
perspective, obtaining adequate cover through taking representations and warranties as to corrupt practices from promoters is necessary, but PE funds must
also consider a strong covenant package obliging portfolio companies to eschew
corrupt practices, conduct periodic reviews, and inform investors regarding any
actual or suspected corrupt activities by the company's officers.

III. CONCLUSION
A quarter of a century has passed since India historically opened up its economy, and we still face regular tinkering and tweaking to our commercial laws
that govern business deals and PE transactions. While the commitment to progressively liberalising the economy has continued unabated irrespective of the
party in power at the Centre, India has drawn much criticism over the years over
the slow pace of its reforms, and has drawn even more criticism over the speed
of regulatory action. In light of this unique mix of transformational opportunity
coupled with regulatory fluidity, the role of the Indian transactional lawyer has
assumed tremendous importance. Today, a PE deal lawyer has to grapple with a
frequently changing regulatory and tax environment, and protect his or her clients from any adverse fall-outs arising from such shifting sands. It is important,
therefore, to constantly re-visit known doctrines and customary market positions
on various legal issues while structuring a PE deal in India.
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However, the constantly changing framework does not necessarily always present problems. Often, it presents new opportunities and new ways of deal-structuring as well. Very often, a known and well understood door closes, only for
another to open in its place-most often with the astute efforts and brilliance of
the Indian transactional lawyering community, which itself has evolved into a
professional, battle-wisened bunch that is ready to take on new challenges!

